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A NOTE ON TU¨RING’S 1936
PAOLA CATTABRIGA
Abstract. Tu¨ring’s argument that there can be no machine computing the
diagonal on the enumeration of the computable sequences is not a demonstra-
tion.
As well known, Tu¨ring historical article of 1936 is the result of a special endeavor
focused around the factuality of a general process for algorithmic computation.
As resultant formal model his famous abstract computing machine, soon called
Tu¨ring machine, could be regarded to be a universal feasibility test for computing
procedures. The article begins by accurately outlining the notion of computable
number, that is a real number is computable only if there exists a Tu¨ring machine
that writes all the sequence of its decimal extension. The abstract machine as
a universal feasibility test for computing procedures is then applied up to closely
examining what are considered to be the limits of computation itself, and to defining
a number which is not computable.
The computable numbers do not include, however, all definable
numbers; and an example is given of a definable number which is
not computable (230 [4]).
In Section 8. Application of the diagonal process., is reached the crucial demonstra-
tion establishing some fundamental limits of computation by defining such number
through a self-referring procedure. Present note shows how this procedure can not
actually be regarded as a demonstration. In the following the reader is required
to know Tu¨ring article together with the original notions and symbolism therein
contained [4]. We recall briefly to the reader only a few of the main ones.
Computing machines. If any automatic machine M prints two kinds of symbols,
of which the first kind consists entirely of 0 and 1 (the others being called symbols
of the second kind), then the machine will be called a computing machine. If the
machine is supplied with a blank tape and set in motion, starting from the correct
initial configuration, the subsequence of the symbols printed by it which are of the
first kind will be called the sequence computed by the machine.
Circular and circle-free machines. If a computing machineM never writes down
more than a finite number of symbols of the first kind, it will be called circular.
Otherwise it is said to be circle-free. A machine will be circular if it reaches a
configuration from which there is no possible move, or if it goes on moving, and
possibly printing symbols of the second kind, but cannot print any more symbols
of the first kind.
Computable sequences. A sequence is said to be computable if it can be computed
by a circle-free machine.
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Computable numbers. A number is computable if it differs by an integer from the
number computed by a circle-free machine.
S.D. Any automatic machineM is identified by its Table describing configurations
and behaviors. Any Table can be coded or rewritten in a new description called
the Standard Description ofM.
D.N. Any letter in the standard description of M can be replaced by a number,
so we shall have a description of the machine in the form of an arabic numeral.
The integer represented by this numeral is called Description Number. A number
which is a description number of a circle-free machine will be called a satisfactory
number.
Universal Machine. A universal machine is a computing machine U that, supplied
with a tape on the beginning of which is written the S.D. of a computing machine
M, computes the same sequence ofM.
1.
At the beginning of Section 8. Application of the diagonal process., Tu¨ring
intends to submit to his machine’s feasibility test the application of Cantor’s non-
denumerability of real numbers to the computable sequences [1, 2]. He verifies so if
the diagonal process is suitable to show also the non-denumerability of computable
sequences.
It might, for instance, be thought that the limit of a sequence of
computable numbers must be computable. This is clearly only true
if the sequence of computable numbers is defined by some rule (246
[4]).
A brief and elegant diagonalization is then proposed as follows:
a1 = φ1(1) φ1(2) φ1(3) . . .
. . .
a2 = φ2(1) φ2(2) φ2(3) . . .
. . .
a3 = φ3(1) φ3(2) φ3(3) . . .
...
. . .
an = φn(1) φn(2) φn(3) . . . φn(n)
...
. . .
where an are the computable sequences with the figures φn(m) (on to 0, 1), and β
is the sequence with 1− φn(n) as its n-th figure.
⋆) Since β is computable, there exist a number K such that 1 −
φn(n) = φK(n) all n. Putting n = K, we have 1 = 2φK(K), i.e.
1 is even. The computable sequences are therefore not enumerable.
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Tu¨ring himself considers argument ⋆) fallacious as it presupposes the computabil-
ity of β, which in turn presupposes the enumerability of computable sequences by
finite means. For Tu¨ring the problem of enumerating computable sequences would
be equivalent to finding out whether a given number is the D.N of a circle free
machine and he seems certain that the feasibility test provided by his machine
will show the impossibility for any such process. The most direct proof of impos-
sibility could be to show that there exists a machine that computes β. Tu¨ring
seems here attribute to the reader a special undefined incertitude, a feeling that
“there must be something wrong”. We will not dwell upon whether it should be
the reader or it was Tu¨ring himself to have such inconvenient or inexplicable feel-
ing1. Although considering a diagonalization proof by constructing a machine that
effectively generates β as true, he prefers to test the feasibility of such a general
process for finding whether a given number is the D.N. of a circle free machine,
by means of a self referring argument. His argumentation will not be based on β,
but on constructing β′, whose n-th figure is φn(n), i.e. the same diagonal sequence
φ1(1)φ2(2)φ3(3) . . . φn(n) . . .. In other words, the whole section 8 is based on the
“proof ” that it cannot exists an effective process constructing β′, namely there is
no feasible process generating φ1(1)φ2(2)φ3(3) . . . φn(n) . . .. The presumed demon-
stration is by reductio ad absurdum, assuming that such a process exists for real.
That would be, we have a machine D that given the S.D. of any machine M will
test ifM is circular, marking the S.D. with “u”, or is circle-free, marking the S.D.
with “s”. And then to construct a machine H by combining D and U , where U
simulates M, and generates the computable sequence β′. The machine H would
have its motion divided into sections as follows. In the first N − 1 sections, among
other things, the integers 1, 2, . . .N − 1 will have been written down and tested by
the machine D. A certain number, say R(N − 1), of them will have been found
to be the D.N.’s of circle-free machines. In the N -th section the machine D tests
the number N . If N is satisfactory, i.e., if it is the D.N. of a circle-free machine,
then R(N) = 1 + R(N − 1) and the first R(N) figures of the sequence of which a
D.N. is N are calculated. The R(N)-th figure of this sequence is written down as
one of the figures of the sequence β′ computed by H. If N is not satisfactory, then
R(N) = R(N − 1) and the machine goes on to the (N +1)-th section of its motion
(247 [4]).
The whole argument leads to contradiction when H encounters itself, namely its
own D.N. K, turning out to be H in the meantime circular and circle-free. But
since H is, even if by theoretical assumption, a machine, it is an effective process,
so H is associated to its D.N. K. Nothing really prevents us to define therefore a
machine H′ that is the same as H except that if it encounters the D.N. K do not
1A display of the inferential steps in ⋆) offers perhaps some explicative insight about.
β = 1− φ1(1) 1− φ2(2) 1− φ3(3) . . . 1− φn(n) . . .
1− φn(n) = φK(n) all n ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
K = φK(1) φK(2) φK(3) . . . φK(n) . . .
K = n ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
n = φn(1) φn(2) φn(3) . . . φn(n) . . .
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upload it in β′. So that if H is such that
(1) R(N)
{
N = s then 1 +R(N − 1)
N = u then R(N − 1)
where the number R(N) is the R(N)-th figure of β′, generated by H, then we can
define H′ such that
(2) R′(N)


N = K then R(N − 1)
N = s then 1 +R(N − 1)
N = u then R(N − 1)
where R′(N) is the R(N)-th figure of β′ without R(K). Actually when H ′ is in
the N -th section such that N = K, H′ goes on to the (N + 1)- th section of its
motion. So K, as well as the u numbers, is not included in β′. So what does H′ do
in the K-th section of H? Simply H′ goes on to the (K+1)-th section of H, and its
computation would be carried on. We cannot then state that H′ is circular like H.
And H′ is an effective process satisfying the feasibility test longed by Tu¨ring, which
can always be defined whenever H is too, so his whole argument fails to reach a
contradiction, and does not obtain a result of effective impossibility of the beginning
assumption of the existence of D. We just have no conclusion that there can be no
machine D. There is therefore no proof about having no general process for finding
out whether a given number is the D.N. of a circle-free machine. We can then
regard accordingly all the other arguments arising (248, 259-265 [4]). Furthermore,
considering (2), there is no evidence that K is not effectively computable, so there is
not even an example of a definable number which is not computable. Let us observe
in this regard that the notion of circle-free machines echoes a lot the requirement
that a definition must not be circular, which is what in the Theory of Definition is
known to be ruled by the criterion of eliminability (151-160 [3]). A definition that
does not satisfy this requirement introduces a primitive term indeed, and it is not
a definition at all. One might object that the construction of the number K is not
a definition, but this would not be as stated in [4].
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